Initial Access: TA0001
Initial Access Techniques in Entra ID (Azure Identity Environments)
In Microsoft Entra ID (Azure Active Directory), adversaries use Initial Access techniques to gain a foothold into the cloud identity plane. This includes phishing users, abusing trusted federations (B2B collaboration, cross-tenant access), or exploiting weak/default cloud identities.
Identity is the entry point for most cloud breaches — protecting Entra ID is your first line of defense.
🎯 Drive-by Compromise
| MITRE ID | T1189 |
Description: An adversary compromises a user’s device by tricking them into visiting a malicious website that silently exploits vulnerabilities or drops malware (e.g., token stealers, session hijackers).
Entra ID Example:
Victim visits a malicious site that injects a rogue OAuth application consent prompt ("Consent phishing").
The user unknowingly grants the malicious app access to their Microsoft 365 or Azure resources.
✅ Result: Adversary gains OAuth token access to Entra ID-protected resources without needing credentials.
🎣 Phishing
➡️ Spearphishing Link
| MITRE ID | T1566.002 |
Description: Send a targeted email containing a malicious link that steals Entra ID credentials, MFA codes, or session cookies when clicked.
Entra ID Example:
Victim receives a phishing email mimicking Microsoft login.
Link redirects to an Azure-like phishing page (
login.microsoftonline.com.fake.site) capturing credentials.
✅ Result: Adversary harvests credentials and possibly MFA tokens, gaining Entra ID access.
➡️ Spearphishing Voice (Vishing)
| MITRE ID | T1566.004 |
Description: Call targeted users pretending to be Microsoft support or IT helpdesk and trick them into revealing credentials, MFA codes, or approving MFA push notifications.
Entra ID Example:
Victim receives a call instructing them to "verify" their MFA code or approve an MFA prompt.
Attacker simultaneously attempts login and tricks victim into approving.
✅ Result: Adversary bypasses MFA and gains account access.
🔗 Trusted Relationship
| MITRE ID | T1199 |
Description: Abuse federated identities, cross-tenant B2B access, or delegated admin privileges to gain access to Entra ID resources.
Entra ID Example:
Attacker compromises an account from a trusted external tenant (Azure B2B collaboration).
Uses trust relationship to access internal Entra ID groups, apps, or resources.
✅ Result: Access internal resources without needing direct exploitation.
👤 Valid Accounts
➡️ Default Accounts
| MITRE ID | T1078.004 |
Description: Abuse default service principals, automation accounts, managed identities, or misconfigured guest accounts in Entra ID.
Entra ID Example:
An attacker finds a default Entra ID guest account that still has "Contributor" role assigned in Azure subscriptions.
✅ Result: Immediate access using poorly configured identities.
➡️ Cloud Accounts
| MITRE ID | T1078.004 |
Description: Use stolen or leaked Entra ID cloud user accounts (standard users, admins, service principals) to authenticate directly.
Entra ID Example:
Attacker phishes a standard Entra ID user or recovers leaked Office 365 credentials.
Logs into Azure and enumerates environment.
✅ Result: Legitimate-looking session inside Entra ID and Azure.
📊 Initial Access Techniques in Entra ID (MITRE Mapped)
Drive-by Compromise
T1189
OAuth app consent phishing via rogue site
Spearphishing Link
T1566.002
Email phishing with Azure login clone
Spearphishing Voice (Vishing)
T1566.004
Fake IT support call to capture MFA code
Trusted Relationship
T1199
Abuse external Azure AD B2B tenant trust
Default Accounts
T1078.004
Misconfigured guest/service principal usage
Cloud Accounts
T1078.004
Use stolen cloud user or service principal credentials
🎯 Final Summary
Defending against Initial Access in Entra ID focuses on:
Hardening user authentication flows (MFA, CA policies, phishing-resistant auth)
Securing and monitoring trusted relationships
Reducing the blast radius of default, guest, and service principal accounts
Detecting credential phishing attempts early
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